OPTIMAL-CONTRACTS WITH PUBLIC EX POST INFORMATION

被引：69

作者：

RIORDAN, MH ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, DEM ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELL COMMUN RES,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1988年 / 45卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90260-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：189 / 199

页数：11

共 18 条

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