REPEATED GAMES WITH LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS

被引：78

作者：

FUDENBERG, D

KREPS, DM

MASKIN, ES

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

[2] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1990年 / 57卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2298086

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：555 / 573

页数：19

共 19 条

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MASKIN, E .

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[5]

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[7]

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PORTER, RH .

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[10]

HALL P., 1980, MARTINGALE THEORY IT

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