PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT AND THE VETO

被引:25
作者
INGBERMAN, DE
YAO, DA
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2111367
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
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页码:357 / 389
页数:33
相关论文
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