EFFECTS OF PRESSURES TO REACH AGREEMENT IN BARGAINING

In a 2-person bargaining game, the effects of unilateral and multilateral pressures to reach agreement manipulated by imposing a cost/trial were studied in 2 related experiments with 80 male undergraduates in each. In Exp. I, preprogramed feedback was employed, and in Exp. II, pairs of Ss bargained with each other. It was concluded that: (1) concession making and trials to reach agreement are directly related to pressures to reach agreement; (2) mutual pressures to reach agreement evoke reciprocated concession making, but not when pressures are unilaterally applied; and (3) a firm bargaining strategy evokes greater concessions only if the other party is under pressures to settle. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1969 American Psychological Association.