COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS OF NUMBER OF BIDDERS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ON BEHAVIOR IN 2ND-PRICE COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS

被引:29
作者
KAGEL, JH
LEVIN, D
HARSTAD, RM
机构
[1] UNIV HOUSTON,DEPT ECON,HOUSTON,TX
[2] RUTGERS STATE UNIV,FAC MANAGEMENT,PISCATAWAY,NJ 08855
[3] RUTGERS STATE UNIV,RUTCOR,PISCATAWAY,NJ 08855
关键词
AUCTIONS; COMMON VALUE; INFORMATION; LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS;
D O I
10.1007/BF01243157
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Comparative static tests of Nash bidding theory in second-price common value auctions show that bidders fail to respond in the right direction to more rivals and to public information concerning the value of the item. The former provides a clear indication that bidders fail to appreciate the adverse selection forces inherent in common value auctions, while the latter shows that policy prescriptions can fail given out-of-equilibrium behavior. These tests of Nash bidding theory apply to a far wider variety of circumstances than in first-price auctions, so there is less scope to rationalize the failure of the theory.
引用
收藏
页码:293 / 319
页数:27
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