AUCTIONS WITH PRICE-PROPORTIONAL BENEFITS TO BIDDERS

被引：36

作者：

ENGELBRECHTWIGGANS, R

机构：

[1] Department of Business Administration, University of Illinois Urbana and Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1994年 / 6卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1994.1020

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

After some auctions, including Amish estate sales and buyer rings' knockout auctions, each bidder receives a share of the revenue generated by the auction We show that in the symmetric case, equilibrium bids in both first-price sealed-bid auctions and oral auctions increase as each bidder's share increases. In the case of independent signals, oral auctions result in higher expected equilibrium prices than do first-price sealed-bid auctions. Journal of Economic, Literature classification number: D44. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：339 / 346

页数：8