COLLUSIVE BIDDER BEHAVIOR AT SINGLE-OBJECT 2ND-PRICE AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS

[1] [Anonymous], 1967, AUCTIONS AUCTIONEERI

[2] DAVID HA, 1981, ORDER STATISTICS

[3] ENGLEBRECHTWIGG.R, 1980, MANAGE SCI, V26, P119

[4] GRAHAM DA, 1984, 8407 DUK U DEP EC WO

[5] GRAHAM DA, 1985, 8501 DUK U DEP EC WO

[6] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[7] EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (06) : 1799 - 1819

[8] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73

[9] MYERSON RB, 1983, AUCTIONS BIDDING CON

[10] RILEY JG, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P381

[1] [Anonymous], 1967, AUCTIONS AUCTIONEERI

[2] DAVID HA, 1981, ORDER STATISTICS

[3] ENGLEBRECHTWIGG.R, 1980, MANAGE SCI, V26, P119

[4] GRAHAM DA, 1984, 8407 DUK U DEP EC WO

[5] GRAHAM DA, 1985, 8501 DUK U DEP EC WO

[6] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340

[7] EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (06) : 1799 - 1819

[8] OPTIMAL AUCTION DESIGN [J]. MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 1981, 6 (01) : 58 - 73

[9] MYERSON RB, 1983, AUCTIONS BIDDING CON

[10] RILEY JG, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P381