EFFICIENCY DESPITE MUTUALLY PAYOFF-RELEVANT PRIVATE INFORMATION - THE FINITE CASE

被引：40

作者：

JOHNSON, S

PRATT, JW

ZECKHAUSER, RJ

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,JOHN F KENNEDY SCH GOVT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

[2] HARVARD UNIV,SCH BUSINESS,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1990年 / 58卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938354

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：873 / 900

页数：28

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