高管薪酬差距的阴暗面——基于企业违规行为的研究

被引:53
作者
魏芳
耿修林
机构
[1] 南京大学商学院
关键词
高管薪酬差距; 企业违规行为; 锦标赛机制; 财务困境; 行业竞争;
D O I
10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2018.03.004
中图分类号
F272.92 [人事管理];
学科分类号
摘要
锦标赛理论认为,高管团队垂直薪酬差距是一种有效的薪酬激励机制,能够激励高管努力工作。但是,薪酬差距也可能增加高管的自利行为动机和冒险倾向,诱发高管的不正当努力,最终导致企业违规行为。本文利用2006-2015年A股上市公司的数据资料,选择面板计数模型和面板二值选择模型,研究了高管垂直薪酬差距对企业违规行为的影响,揭示了锦标赛机制可能存在的负面激励效应。研究结果表明,高管薪酬差距与企业违规行为显著正相关,企业内部的财务困境压力和企业外部的行业竞争压力都抑制了高管薪酬差距带来的违规倾向。
引用
收藏
页码:57 / 73
页数:17
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