On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

被引：11

作者：

Houba, Harold ^{[2
,3
]}

Wen, Quan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Vanderbilt Univ, Dept Econ, Nashville, TN 37235 USA

[2] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econometr, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

[3] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Tinbergen Inst, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2008年 / 37卷 / 03期

关键词：

bargaining; negotiation;

D O I：

10.1007/s00199-007-0306-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract negotiation model where the union must choose between strike and holdout between offers and counter-offers. When the union and the firm have different discount factors, delay in reaching an agreement may Pareto dominate many immediate agreements. We derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs and characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. In particular, our analysis clarifies open issues on the maximal wage in this model when the union has a higher discount factor than the firm.

引用

页码：509 / 519

页数：11

共 16 条

[1] EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH INFINITELY MANY COMMODITIES [J].