Procurement favouritism and technology adoption

被引：13

作者：

Branco, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, FCEE, P-1649023 Lisbon, Portugal

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2002年 / 46卷 / 01期

关键词：

procurement; protection; technology adoption; auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00083-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

It is well known that the design of cost minimizing procurement rules for the selection of a contractor among distinct technological groups requires the favouritism of inefficient firms. In this paper, I show that, if technology adoption is non-contractible, these policies will also provide optimal incentives for the inefficient firms to adopt more efficient technologies. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：73 / 91

页数：19

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