The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting

被引:638
作者
Burns, N [1 ]
Kedia, S
机构
[1] Univ Georgia, Terry Coll Business, Athens, GA 30602 USA
[2] Rutgers State Univ, Rutgers Business Sch, Newark, NJ 07102 USA
关键词
restatements; misreporting; compensation; options;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:35 / 67
页数:33
相关论文
共 34 条
[11]  
Dechow P.M., 1996, Contemporary Accounting Research, V13, P1, DOI 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x
[12]  
DECHOW PM, 1995, ACCOUNT REV, V70, P193
[13]   DEBT COVENANT VIOLATION AND MANIPULATION OF ACCRUALS [J].
DEFOND, ML ;
JIAMBALVO, J .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 1994, 17 (1-2) :145-176
[14]  
DESAI H, 2003, UNPUB REPUTATIONAL P
[15]  
GAO P, 2002, UNPUB EARNINGS MANAG
[16]  
*GEN ACC OFF, 2002, GAO03138
[17]   Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? [J].
Hall, BJ ;
Liebman, JB .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1998, 113 (03) :653-691
[18]  
HEALY PM, 1985, J ACCOUNT ECON, V7, P85, DOI 10.1016/0165-4101(85)90029-1
[19]  
Jensen MC, 2001, HARVARD BUS REV, V79, P94
[20]   THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE [J].
JENSEN, MC ;
MECKLING, WH .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) :305-360