Information cascades: Replication and an extension to majority rule and conformity-rewarding institutions

被引：124

作者：

Hung, AA

Plott, CR

机构：

[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, John Heinz III Sch Publ Policy & Management, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

[2] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2001年 / 91卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.91.5.1508

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：1508 / 1520

页数：13

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