Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

被引:31
作者
Ballesteros-Perez, Pablo [1 ]
Carmen Gonzalez-Cruz, Ma [2 ]
Canavate-Grimal, Antonio [3 ]
Pellicer, Eugenio [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Talca, Fac Ingn, Dpto Ingn & Gest Construcc, Curico, Chile
[2] Univ Politecn Valencia, Escuela Tecn Super Ingenieros Ind, Dept Proyectos Ingn, Valencia 46022, Spain
[3] Univ CEU Cardenal Herrera, ESET, Dept Ingn Edificac & Prod Ind, Valencia, Spain
[4] Univ Politecn Valencia, Sch Civil Engn, Valencia 46022, Spain
关键词
Tender; Auction; Collusion; Abnormal bid; Phony bid; Bid-covering; TACIT COLLUSION; CONTRACTORS DECISION; AUCTIONS; COMPETITION; 1ST-PRICE; BEHAVIOR; PROFIT;
D O I
10.1016/j.autcon.2012.11.036
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:215 / 229
页数:15
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