A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma

被引：97

作者：

Ely, JC

Välimäki, J

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Univ Southampton, Dept Econ, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 102卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.2000.2774

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We prove the Folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.

引用

页码：84 / 105

页数：22

共 18 条

[1] Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring [J].

Bhaskar, V ;

Obara, I .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2002, 102 (01) :40-69

[2] Informational constraints and the overlapping generations model: Folk and anti-folk theorems [J].

Bhaskar, V .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1998, 65 (01) :135-149

[3] COOPERATION IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA WITH ANONYMOUS RANDOM MATCHING [J].

ELLISON, G .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1994, 61 (03) :567-588

[4] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

MASKIN, E .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) :533-554

[5] THE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

LEVINE, D ;

MASKIN, E .

ECONOMETRICA, 1994, 62 (05) :997-1039

[6] ON THE DISPENSABILITY OF PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION IN DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

MASKIN, E .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1991, 53 (02) :428-438

[7] NONCOOPERATIVE COLLUSION UNDER IMPERFECT PRICE INFORMATION [J].

GREEN, EJ ;

PORTER, RH .

ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (01) :87-100

[8]

KANDORI M, 2000, UNPUB EFFICIENCY REP

[9] NASH EQUILIBRIA OF N-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES WITH SEMISTANDARD INFORMATION [J].

LEHRER, E .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1990, 19 (02) :191-217

[10] LOWER EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN 2-PLAYER REPEATED GAMES WITH NON-OBSERVABLE ACTIONS [J].

LEHRER, E .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 1989, 18 (01) :57-89

← 1 2 →