Confidence and the welfare of less-informed investors

被引：48

作者：

Bloomfield, R ^{[1
]}

Libby, R ^{[1
]}

Nelson, MW ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Cornell Univ, Johnson Grad Sch Management, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

来源：

ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY | 1999年 / 24卷 / 08期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0361-3682(99)00025-2

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In response to recommendations by the AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting and the Association for Investment Management and Research, the FASB recently invited comment regarding the question, "Given [efficient] markets, would any disservice be done to the interests of individual investors by allowing professional investors access to more extensive information?" [AICPA (1996) Report of the Special Committee on Financial Reporting and the Association for Investment Management and Research, New York, p. 22]. Research in psychology [e.g. Griffin & Tversky (1992) The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence. Cognitive Psychology, 411-435] suggests that less-informed investors may suffer from over-confidence and trade too aggressively given their information. This paper reports on an experiment designed to address these issues. In the experiment, security values are determined by the price/book ratios of actual firms, "more-informed" investors observe three value-relevant financial ratios derived from Value-Line reports, and "less-informed" investors observe only one of those signals. Even after market prices have stabilized after many rounds of trading, less-informed investors systematically transfer wealth to more-informed investors as a result of biased prices and overly aggressive trading. However, alerting less-informed investors to the extent of their informational disadvantage eliminates these welfare losses. The results thus suggest that providing information to only professional investors could harm the welfare of less-informed investors if less-informed investors are not aware of the extent of their informational disadvantage. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：623 / 647

页数：25

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