What really matters in auction design

被引:384
作者
Klemperer, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0895330027166
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all."
引用
收藏
页码:169 / 189
页数:21
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