A comparison of punishment rules in repeated public good games - An experimental study

被引：39

作者：

Decker, T ^{[1
]}

Stiehler, A

Strobel, M

机构：

[1] Humboldt Univ, Inst Operat Res, Berlin, Germany

[2] Max Planck Inst Res Econ Syst, Strateg Interact Grp, Jena, Germany

[3] Maastricht Univ, Dept Econ, Maastricht, Netherlands

[4] Maastricht Univ, Int Inst Infon, Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION | 2003年 / 47卷 / 06期

关键词：

public good; free riding; cooperation; punishment; experiment;

D O I：

10.1177/0022002703258795

中图分类号：

D81 [国际关系];

学科分类号：

030207 ;

摘要：

One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants' support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results show that besides profit differences, the degree of consent required by the collective rule is essential for the degree of support by the participants.

引用

页码：751 / 772

页数：22

共 23 条

[1] Giving according to garp: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism [J].