Optimal reservation prices in auctions

被引：41

作者：

Levin, D ^{[1
]}

Smith, JL ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] SO METHODIST UNIV,DALLAS,TX 75275

来源：

ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1996年 / 106卷 / 438期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2235520

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The risk-neutral independent-private-values (IPV) auction model produces curious results regarding the use of reservation prices: no matter how many bidders, the seller should announce a fixed reservation price above his true value. This is notable since the seller gains by adopting an inefficient institution, and puzzling because it conflicts with common practice. We relax the IPV assumption, characterise optimal reservation prices in a richer class of auctions, and show that when information is correlated the seller's optimal reservation price converges to his true value, often monotonically and rapidly, as the number of bidders grows.

引用

页码：1271 / 1283

页数：13

共 23 条

[1]

[Anonymous], 1989, Auctions: The Social Construction of Value

[2] HOW AUCTIONS WORK FOR WINE AND ART [J].