The English auction is optimal among simple sequential auctions

被引：18

作者：

Lopomo, G

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

[2] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1998年 / 82卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/jeth.1998.2425

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named "Simple Sequential Auctions." (C) 1998 Academic Press.

引用

页码：144 / 166

页数：23

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