Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences

被引：7

作者：

Attar, Andrea ^{[2
]}

Majumdar, Dipjyoti ^{[3
]}

Piaser, Gwenael ^{[4
]}

Porteiro, Nicolas ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Pablo Olavide, Seville 41013, Spain

[2] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[3] Concordia Univ, Montreal, PQ H4B 1R6, Canada

[4] Univ Luxembourg, CREFI, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2008年 / 56卷 / 01期

关键词：

Revelation principle; common agency; separable preferences;

D O I：

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.11.001

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold when finite games with generic payoffs are considered. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals' payoffs. This provides a rationale for the restriction to direct mechanisms even when competition among principals is considered. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：75 / 95

页数：21

共 34 条

[1] Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy [J].