A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard

被引：6

作者：

Attar, Andrea

Piaser, Gwenael

Porteiro, Nicolas

机构：

[1] Univ Toulouse 1, IDEI, F-31042 Toulouse, France

[2] Univ Roma La Sapienza, I-00161 Rome, Italy

[3] Univ Ca Foscari Venezia, Venice, Italy

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2007年 / 95卷 / 02期

关键词：

menus; Common Agency;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.10.021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：278 / 284

页数：7

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