Doxastic conditions for backward induction

被引：9

作者：

Clausing, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Magdeburg, Fac Management & Econ, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany

来源：

THEORY AND DECISION | 2003年 / 54卷 / 04期

关键词：

backward induction; conditionals; doxastic logic;

D O I：

10.1023/B:THEO.0000004258.22525.f4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived.

引用

页码：315 / 336

页数：22

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