Governance and bank valuation

被引:268
作者
Caprio, Gerard [1 ]
Laeven, Luc
Levine, Ross
机构
[1] Williams Coll, Dept Econ, Williamstown, MA 01267 USA
[2] Int Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431 USA
[3] Brown Univ, Providence, RI 02912 USA
[4] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
corporate governance; securities law; regulation; banking; financial institutions; international finance; market structure;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfi.2006.10.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:584 / 617
页数:34
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