Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores

被引：102

作者：

Sönmez, T ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Michigan, Dept Econ, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1468-0262.00044

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：677 / 689

页数：13

共 26 条

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