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[21] Roth AE., 1992, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis

[22] Roth Alvin E., 1977, Journal of Mathematical Economics, V4, P131

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[25] SONMEZ T, 1996, EC DESIGN, V1, P365

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[21] Roth AE., 1992, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis

[22] Roth Alvin E., 1977, Journal of Mathematical Economics, V4, P131

[23] STRATEGY-PROFFNESS AND ARROWS CONDITIONS - EXISTENCE AND CORRESPONDENCE THEOREMS FOR VOTING PROCEDURES AND SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1975, 10 (02) : 187 - 217

[24] Shapley L., 1974, J MATH ECON, V1, P23, DOI [10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0, DOI 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0]

[25] SONMEZ T, 1996, EC DESIGN, V1, P365

[26] THE DIVISION-PROBLEM WITH SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES - A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE UNIFORM ALLOCATION RULE [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1991, 59 (02) : 509 - 519