Information policy: Shaping the value of agency relationships

被引：84

作者：

Jacobides, MG ^{[1
]}

Croson, DC

机构：

[1] London Business Sch, London NW1 4SA, England

[2] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

来源：

ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW | 2001年 / 26卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.5465/AMR.2001.4378014

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We evaluate how changes in information use affect agency relationships. Information asymmetry redistributes value, but imperfect monitoring also encourages agents to take inefficient actions to influence this redistribution. thereby reducing joint agency value. Changing focus. from minimizing principals' costs to maximizing joint agency value, we argue that more monitoring is not always better, and we explore, through a six-sector framework. how more extensive use of information benefits (or damages) value creation and affects its distribution.

引用

页码：202 / 223

页数：22

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