Public debt and optimal taxes without commitment

被引：13

作者：

Dominguez, Begona ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Auckland, Dept Econ, Auckland 1, New Zealand

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2007年 / 135卷 / 01期

关键词：

fiscal policy; optimal taxation; time-consistency;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.011

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Benhabib and Rustichini [Optimal taxes without commitment, J. Econ. Theory 77 (1997) 231-259] study the properties of optimal capital taxes in economies without commitment and no government debt. They find that capital taxes may be different from zero at steady state. This note shows that, once governments have the possibility of issuing debt and smoothing taxes over time, optimal steady state capital taxes turn out to be zero. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：159 / 170

页数：12

共 6 条

[1] TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].