The composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure

被引：99

作者：

Kwak, Byungjin ^{[1
]}

Ro, Byung T. ^{[1
,2
]}

Suk, Inho ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Korea Adv Inst Sci & Technol, Grad Sch Finance & Accounting, Seoul, South Korea

[2] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA

[3] SUNY Buffalo, Sch Management, Buffalo, NY 14260 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2012年 / 54卷 / 01期

关键词：

Top management composition; General counsel; Voluntary governance mechanism; Voluntary information disclosure; Management earnings forecasts; SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM; EARNINGS FORECASTS; DISCRETIONARY DISCLOSURE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; REGULATION FD; SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION; BAD-NEWS; ASSOCIATION; ENVIRONMENT; OUTCOMES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.04.001

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine whether the composition of top management with General Counsel (GC) affects properties of management earnings forecasts disclosures. After controlling for corporate governance and litigation risk, we find that firms with a GC in top management are more likely to issue forecasts, particularly bad news forecasts, than other firms. Further, their forecasts are less optimistic and more accurate than those issued by others. Consistently, the stock price reaction to their forecast news is stronger. These effects are more pronounced when the GC's managerial status is higher. Overall, our results suggest that GCs play an important role in corporate disclosures. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：19 / 41

页数：23

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