A multi-winner nested rent-seeking contest

被引：67

作者：

Clark, DJ ^{[1
]}

Riis, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] FDN RES ECON & BUSINESS ADM SNF,N-0371 OSLO,NORWAY

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1996年 / 87卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00151735

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper considers a symmetric imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contest in which there may be several winners. We first demonstrate a serious flaw in previous work and then go on to suggest an alternative method for analyzing the contest. In contrast to the previous work, we show that the value of the rent is fully dissipated in equilibrium as the number of players becomes large.

引用

页码：177 / 184

页数：8

共 14 条

[1] RENT-SEEKING WITH MULTIPLE WINNERS [J].