RENT-SEEKING WITH MULTIPLE WINNERS

被引：20

作者：

BERRY, SK

机构：

[1] Department of Economics and Business, Hendrix College, Conway, 72032, AR

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1993年 / 77卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01047881

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the impact of the number of winners allowed by regulators on rent-seeking expenditures. It is demonstrated in a widely used model that an increase in the number of winners will decrease total rent-seeking expenditures. This result is generally obtained regardless of whether the firms are risk-averse or risk-lovers. When regulators award coveted market franchises, there will be smaller welfare losses if more winners are allowed.

引用

页码：437 / 443

页数：7

共 10 条

[1] CRIME AND PUNISHMENT - ECONOMIC APPROACH [J].