Brand extension as informational leverage

被引:83
作者
Choi, JP [1 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.00063
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The marketing literature refers to the concept of brand capital and provides empirical evidence that firms with a large stock of well-established brands have an advantage in introducing new products. This paper develops a theory of brand extension as a mechanism for informational leverage in which a firm leverages off a good's reputation in one market to alleviate the problem of informational asymmetry encountered in other markets. It is shown that brand extension helps a multi-product monopolist introduce a new experience good with less price distortion. Thus, the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the concept of brand capital.
引用
收藏
页码:655 / 669
页数:15
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