Evolutionary learning in signalling games

被引:8
作者
Jacobsen, HJ [1 ]
Jensen, M [1 ]
Sloth, B [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.2000.0795
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57-54) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the so-called Riley equilibrium will be observed frequently. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:34 / 63
页数:30
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