When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

被引:174
作者
Devetag, Giovanna
Ortmann, Andreas
机构
[1] Univ Perugia, Dept Law & Management, I-06123 Perugia, Italy
[2] Acad Sci Czech Republ, Prague 11121, Czech Republic
[3] Charles Univ Prague, CERGE EI, Prague 11121, Czech Republic
关键词
coordination games; Pareto-ranked equilibria; payoff-asymmetric equilibria; stag-hunt games; optimization incentives; robustness; coordination; coordination failure;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-007-9178-9
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We conclude that there are many ways to engineer coordination successes.
引用
收藏
页码:331 / 344
页数:14
相关论文
共 52 条
[1]  
AUMANN R, 1990, EC DECISION MAKING G, P123
[2]  
Bangun L., 2006, ECO B, V3, P1
[3]   Optimization incentives and coordination failure in laboratory stag hunt games [J].
Battalio, R ;
Samuelson, L ;
Van Huyck, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 2001, 69 (03) :749-764
[4]   Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results [J].
Berninghaus, SK ;
Ehrhart, KM .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1998, 37 (02) :231-248
[5]   Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence [J].
Berninghaus, SK ;
Ehrhart, KM .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2001, 73 (03) :345-351
[6]   The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria [J].
Blume, Andreas ;
Ortmann, Andreas .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2007, 132 (01) :274-290
[7]   The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: an experimental study [J].
Bornstein, G ;
Gneezy, U ;
Nagel, R .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2002, 41 (01) :1-25
[8]   A change would do you good ... An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations [J].
Brandts, J ;
Cooper, DJ .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2006, 96 (03) :669-693
[9]   Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study [J].
Brandts, Jordi ;
Cooper, David J. .
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 9 (04) :407-423
[10]   Risk, pre-play communication and equilibrium [J].
Burton, A ;
Sefton, M .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2004, 46 (01) :23-40