Taking the lab to the field: Experimental tests of alternative mechanisms to procure multiple contracts

被引:11
作者
Lunander, A [1 ]
Nilsson, JE
机构
[1] Univ Orebro, Dept Econ, Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst, S-70182 Orebro, Sweden
[2] Dalarna Univ, Dept Econ, Swedish Natl Rd & Transport Res Inst, S-78127 Borlange, Sweden
关键词
multiple units; non-constant costs; asymmetric redemption values; alternative procurement mechanisms;
D O I
10.1023/B:REGE.0000008654.68169.08
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of the experiment is based on experiences from a public procurement auction of road markings in Sweden. Bidders are asymmetric in their cost functions; some exhibit decreasing average costs of winning more than one contract, whereas other bidders have increasing average cost functions. The combinatorial bidding mechanism is demonstrated to be most efficient. The second part of the paper describes how the lab experiment was followed up by a field test of a combinatorial procurement auction of road markings.
引用
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页码:39 / 58
页数:20
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