The pleasure of being nasty

被引：127

作者：

Abbink, Klaus ^{[2
]}

Sadrieh, Abdolkarim ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Magdeburg, Fac Econ & Management, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany

[2] Univ Amsterdam, Fac Econ & Business, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 105卷 / 03期

关键词：

Spite; Nastiness; Money-burning; Anti-social behavior; PUNISHMENT; FAIRNESS; COOPERATION; RECIPROCITY; COMPETITION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2009.08.024

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We introduce the joy-of-destruction game. Two players each receive an endowment and simultaneously decide on how Much of the other player's endowment to destroy. In a treatment without fear of retaliation, money is destroyed in almost 40% of all decisions. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：306 / 308

页数：3

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