Profit or patients' health benefit? Exploring the heterogeneity in physician altruism

被引:113
作者
Godager, Geir [1 ,2 ]
Wiesen, Daniel [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oslo, Inst Hlth & Soc, Dept Hlth Management & Hlth Econ, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
[2] Akershus Univ Hosp, Hlth Serv Res Unit HOKH, Lorenskog, Norway
[3] Univ Cologne, Fac Management Economics & Social Sci, Dept Personnel Econ & Human Resource Management, Cologne, Germany
关键词
Payment incentives; Physician behavior; Physician altruism; Health care quantity; Mixed logit regression; PAYMENT SYSTEMS; MIXED LOGIT; LAB EXPERIMENTS; PREFERENCES; INSURANCE; SERVICES; INCENTIVES; BEHAVIOR; DOCTORS; INCOMES;
D O I
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.08.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper investigates physician altruism toward patients' health benefit using behavioral data from Hennig-Schmidt et al.'s (2011) laboratory experiment. In the experiment, medical students in the role of physicians decide on the provision of medical services. The experimental setup allows us to identify the influence of profits and patients' health benefit on the choice of medical treatment. We estimate physician altruism, the weight individuals attach to patients' health benefit, by fitting mixed logit and multinomial logit regression models to the experimental data. Estimation results provide evidence for physician altruism. We find, however, substantial variation in the degree of physician altruism. We also discuss some implications of our results for the design of physician payment schemes in the light of the theoretical literature. (C) 2013 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1105 / 1116
页数:12
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