A comparison of Dodgson's method and the Borda count

被引：24

作者：

Ratliff, TC ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Wheaton Coll, Dept Math, Norton, MA 02766 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC THEORY | 2002年 / 20卷 / 02期

关键词：

voting theory; Dogson's method; Borda count;

D O I：

10.1007/s001990100218

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In an election without a Condorcet winner, Dodgson's Method is designed to find the candidate that is "closest" to being a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we show that the winner from Dodgson's Method can occur at any position in the ranking obtained from the Borda Count, the plurality method, or any other positional voting procedure. In addition, we demonstrate that Dodgson's Method does not satisfy the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom.

引用

页码：357 / 372

页数：16

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[2]

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[5]

Saari D.G., 1995, BASIC GEOMETRY VOTIN, DOI DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-57748-2

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ECONOMIC THEORY, 2000, 15 (01) :1-53

[7] A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule [J].

Saari, DG ;

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SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2000, 17 (03) :403-438

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