A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule

被引:47
作者
Saari, DG [1 ]
Merlin, VR
机构
[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Math, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
[2] Univ Caen, MRSH, CREME, GEMMA, F-14032 Caen, France
关键词
D O I
10.1007/s003550050171
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
By using geometry, a fairly complete analysis of Kemeny's rule (KR) is obtained. It is shown that the Borda Count (BC) always ranks the KR winner above the KR loser, and, conversely, KR always ranks the BC winner above the BC loser. Such KR relationships fail to hold for other positional methods. The geometric reasons why KR enjoys remarkably consistent election rankings as candidates are added or dropped are explained. The power of this KR consistency is demonstrated by comparing KR and BC outcomes. But KR's consistency carries a heavy cost; it requires KR to partially dismiss the crucial "individual rationality of voters" assumption.
引用
收藏
页码:403 / 438
页数:36
相关论文
共 25 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], J EC THEORY
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1994, GEOMETRY VOTING
[3]  
Arrow K., 1986, SOCIAL CHOICE MULTIC
[4]  
DEBORDA JC, 1981, MEMOIRE ELECT SCRUTI
[5]  
FARKAS D, 1979, ECONOMETRICA, V49, P1305
[6]   MANIPULATION OF VOTING SCHEMES - GENERAL RESULT [J].
GIBBARD, A .
ECONOMETRICA, 1973, 41 (04) :587-601
[7]  
KENDALL MG, 1962, RANK CORRELATION MET, pCH6
[8]   DYNAMICAL MODEL OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM [J].
KRAMER, GH .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 16 (02) :310-334
[9]   A Borda measure for social choice functions [J].
LeBreton, M ;
Truchon, M .
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1997, 34 (03) :249-272
[10]   Copeland method .2. Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes [J].
Merlin, VR ;
Saari, DG .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 72 (01) :148-172