A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule

被引：47

作者：

Saari, DG ^{[1
]}

Merlin, VR

机构：

[1] Northwestern Univ, Dept Math, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

[2] Univ Caen, MRSH, CREME, GEMMA, F-14032 Caen, France

来源：

SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | 2000年 / 17卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s003550050171

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

By using geometry, a fairly complete analysis of Kemeny's rule (KR) is obtained. It is shown that the Borda Count (BC) always ranks the KR winner above the KR loser, and, conversely, KR always ranks the BC winner above the BC loser. Such KR relationships fail to hold for other positional methods. The geometric reasons why KR enjoys remarkably consistent election rankings as candidates are added or dropped are explained. The power of this KR consistency is demonstrated by comparing KR and BC outcomes. But KR's consistency carries a heavy cost; it requires KR to partially dismiss the crucial "individual rationality of voters" assumption.

引用

页码：403 / 438

页数：36

共 25 条

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MERLIN VR, 1996, THESIS U CAEN JUNE

[12] CONDORCET PRINCIPLE IMPLIES THE NO SHOW PARADOX [J].