On the informational role of quantities: Durable goods and consumers' word-of-mouth communication

被引:24
作者
Vettas, N [1 ]
机构
[1] UNIV PENN,DEPT ECON,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2527222
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A dynamic incomplete information game is set up to study the introduction of a durable good when consumers can learn its quality from previous buyers. High sales today imply fewer potential buyers tomorrow, but each buyer will have better information about the good. Consumers are fully rational and can update their beliefs even when they do not directly receive information: in equilibrium, no news is bad news. A low-quality firm follows a 'fly-by-night' strategy, randomizing over the timing of sales. A high-quality firm spreads out its sales more smoothly, solving a stochastic dynamic programming problem.
引用
收藏
页码:915 / 944
页数:30
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