Equivalence and invariance of the index and degree of Nash equilibria

被引:14
作者
Govindan, S [1 ]
Wilson, R [1 ]
机构
[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1997.0516
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash graph to the space of games. We show that the index and the degree of each component are the same. Further, they are invariant to adding or deleting redundant strategies, so they depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. Applications include Kohlberg and Mertens' existence theorems for stable sets and a simple procedure for calculating the degree of a component. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:56 / 61
页数:6
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