An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection

被引：18

作者：

Ania, AB

Tröger, T

Wambach, A

机构：

[1] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, A-1010 Vienna, Austria

[2] Univ Calif Santa Barbara, Dept Econ, Santa Barbara, CA 93106 USA

[3] Univ Munich, Dept Econ, D-80539 Munich, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2002年 / 40卷 / 02期

关键词：

insurance markets; adverse selection; bounded rationality; imitation; local experiments; stochastic stability;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00002-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The equilibrium nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz's insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting. Insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised: profitable competitors' contracts are imitated and loss-making contracts are withdrawn. Occasionally, a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts. We show that Rothschild and Stiglitz's candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long-run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently "similar" to those currently on the market. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

引用

页码：153 / 184

页数：32