Coordinating supply chains with simple pricing schemes: The role of vendor-managed inventories

被引:102
作者
Bernstein, Fernando [1 ]
Chen, Fangruo
Federgruen, Awi
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27708 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Grad Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA
关键词
supply chain coordination; pricing; vendor-managed inventory; echelon operational autonomy;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1060.0564
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We characterize supply chain settings in-which perfect coordination can be achieved with simple wholesale pricing schemes: either retailer-specific constant unit wholesale prices or retailer-specific volume discount schemes. We confine ourselves to two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of retailers who compete with each other by selecting sales quantities. We identify a key sufficient condition, in terms of interdependencies between chain members' operational decisions, under which perfect coordination via simple schemes is feasible, under general cost and demand functions. This condition, which we refer to as echelon operational autonomy (EOA), states that the costs incurred by the supplier for a given vector of sales volumes depends only on operational decisions she controls herself. At the same time, the costs incurred by the retailers may depend on operational decisions controlled by the supplier, in which case, the supplier's operational decisions are made to minimize chainwide costs. We show how vendor-managed inventory (VMI) partnerships create EOA and compare the resulting coordinating pricing schemes with those required in a traditional decentralized setting (without EOA). We also discuss compliance issues with the coordinating schemes in view of the Robinson-Patman act and provide remedies to overcome these issues.
引用
收藏
页码:1483 / 1492
页数:10
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