Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types

被引:5
作者
Cremer, Jacques
Spiegel, Yossi
Zheng, Charles Z.
机构
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Recanati Grad Sch Business Adm, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Univ Toulouse, GREMAQ, IDEI, Toulouse, France
[3] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
optimal auction; correlated values; search costs; search mechanism; full surplus extraction;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.047
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders' values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is, in general, impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:94 / 100
页数:7
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