Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types

被引：5

作者：

Cremer, Jacques

Spiegel, Yossi

Zheng, Charles Z.

机构：

[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Recanati Grad Sch Business Adm, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[2] Univ Toulouse, GREMAQ, IDEI, Toulouse, France

[3] Northwestern Univ, Dept Econ, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 93卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

optimal auction; correlated values; search costs; search mechanism; full surplus extraction;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.047

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders' values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is, in general, impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：94 / 100

页数：7

共 9 条

[1] Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design [J].