When can a news organization lead public opinion? Ideology versus market forces in decisions to make news

被引:49
作者
Bovitz, GL [1 ]
Druckman, JN
Lupia, A
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Polit Sci, San Diego, CA 92103 USA
[2] Univ Minnesota Twin Cities, Dept Polit Sci, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1023/A:1020350716201
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Do news organizations purposefully lead the public to support a particular ideological agenda? When debating this question, many analysts draw conclusions from weak empirical evidence. We introduce a model that clarifies how a news organization's internal structure combines with market forces to affect when it can lead public opinion. We identify conditions under which liberal reporters or politically-driven media magnates can achieve ideological goals. We also illuminate important barriers that prevent many would-be public opinion leaders from ever satisfying these conditions. We show that internal structure and market forces are critical determinants of any news organization's power over public opinion.
引用
收藏
页码:127 / 155
页数:29
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