MEANING AND CREDIBILITY IN CHEAP-TALK GAMES

被引：199

作者：

FARRELL, J

机构：

[1] University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1993年 / 5卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1993.1029

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

I define neologism-proofness, a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in cheap-talk games. It applies when players have a preexisting common language, so that an unexpected message′s literal meaning is clear, and only credibility restricts communication. I show that certain implausible equilibria are not neologism-proof; in some games, no equilibrium is. Journal of Economic Literature classification numbers: D83 D82 C73. © 1993 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：514 / 531

页数：18

共 20 条

[1] EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN SIGNALING GAMES [J].