Incentives and organizations in the public sector - An interpretative review

被引：414

作者：

Dixit, A ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCES | 2002年 / 37卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/3069614

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper begins with a brief overview of the theory of incentives, with special attention to issues that are important in the public sector, in general and human capital in particular. It then reviews some case studies and empirical studies of incentives in the public sector, examining how these studies relate to the theory. Some implications for reform and design of organizations are drawn.

引用

页码：696 / 727

页数：32

共 59 条

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