PRODUCT FUNCTIONALITY, COMPETITION, AND MULTIPURCHASING

被引:24
作者
Anderson, Simon P.
Foros, Oystein
Kind, Hans Jarle
机构
[1] Univ Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[2] NHH Norwegian Sch Econ, Bergen, Norway
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS; 1ST-ORDER APPROACH; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; INFORMATION-SYSTEMS; MORAL HAZARD; RANKING; INCENTIVES; RISK; CONTINGENCIES; MODELS;
D O I
10.1111/iere.12213
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The more functionalities a good offers, the greater is its perceived quality. Equilibrium prices in standard spatial competition models depend solely on quality differences. We assume that new functionalities are more appreciated the closer a product is to a consumer's ideal variety. Prices are then increasing in functionality levels. Furthermore, we endogenize whether consumers buy only one of two varieties (single-purchase) or both (multipurchase). Under multipurchase, there might be a hump-shaped relationship between equilibrium prices and functionality levels. Therefore, it could be optimal for each supplier to sacrifice sales and set prices so high that multipurchase is eliminated.
引用
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页码:183 / 210
页数:28
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