Fairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself

被引:75
作者
FeldmanHall, Oriel [1 ]
Sokol-Hessner, Peter [1 ]
Van Bavel, Jay J. [1 ]
Phelps, Elizabeth A. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Dept Psychol, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] NYU, Ctr Neural Sci, New York, NY 10003 USA
[3] Nathan S Kline Inst Psychiat Res, Orangeburg, NY 10962 USA
来源
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | 2014年 / 5卷
关键词
SOCIAL NORMS; PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE; ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; HUMAN COOPERATION; CONSTRUAL-LEVEL; ULTIMATUM GAMES; MECHANICAL TURK; CONSISTENCY; FLEXIBILITY; COMPETITION;
D O I
10.1038/ncomms6306
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Classic psychology and economic studies argue that punishment is the standard response to violations of fairness norms. Typically, individuals are presented with the option to punish the transgressor or not. However, such a narrow choice set may fail to capture stronger alternative preferences for restoring justice. Here we show, in contrast to the majority of findings on social punishment, that other forms of justice restoration (for example, compensation to the victim) are strongly preferred to punitive measures. Furthermore, these alternative preferences for restoring justice depend on the perspective of the deciding agent. When people are the recipient of an unfair offer, they prefer to compensate themselves without seeking retribution, even when punishment is free. Yet when people observe a fairness violation targeted at another, they change their decision to the most punitive option. Together these findings indicate that humans prefer alternative forms of justice restoration to punishment alone.
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页数:6
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